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WIRETAPPING: THE FEDERALISM PROBLEM*
In 1934, Congress, pursuant to an extensive
re-appraisal of legislation covering interstate com-
munications, enacted the Federal Communica-
tions Act.' Among the several sections of that
statute was one numbered 605, which read in part:
"No person not being authorized by the sender
shall intercept any communication and divulge
or publish the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted
communication to any person ......
Federal courts have given a broad construction
to §605. Thus, in the celebrated first Nardone
case, the United States Supreme Court held §605
applicable to federal agents testifying in federal
court as to the contents of a wiretapped message.
Rejecting the government's contention to the
contrary, the Court said: "Taken at face value
the phrase 'no person' comprehends federal agents,
and the band on communication to 'any person'
bars testimony to the content of an intercepted
message." '2 Following this decision, the Nardone
case was retried and again reached the Supreme
* This paper is the third in a series dealing with the
law of wiretapping. The first paper in the series, which
was entitled Wiretapping: The Federal Law, appeared
at 51 J. Cam. L., C. & P. S. 441 (1960). The second
paper, entitled Wiretapping: The State Law, may be
found at 51 id. 534 (1961).
148 Stat. 1064 et. seq. (1934), 47 U.S.C. §151 et seq.
(1959).
2 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 381 (1937).
Court. At issue this time was the admissibility
of evidence derived from the original wiretap.
The Court held this derivative evidence inadmis-
sible as "fruit of the poisonous tree." 3
Again placing a broad construction on §605, the
Supreme Court, in Weiss v. United States, found:
"As Congress has power, when necessary for the
protection of interstate commerce, to regulate
intrastate transactions, there is no constitutional
requirement that the scope of the statute be limited
so as to exclude intrastate communications."'4
The Court went on to find that Congress must
have intended to regulate intrastate communica-
tions since it is impossible for an interceptor to
distinguish between calls going into interstate
commerce and those limited to intrastate transac-
tions.
Finally, in Benanti v. United States, the Supreme
Court held wiretap evidence, secured by state
officers acting under a state law permitting wire-
tapping when authorized by court order, inadmis-
sible in a federal prosecution despite the absence
3 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). The
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine was first an-
nounced in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385 (1920).
4 308 U.S. 321, 327 (1939). After the Wess decision,
the feeling was that the only wires beyond the reach of
§605 were those of inter-office phone systems not con-
necting to outside lines.
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of federal participation in obtaining the excluded
evidence. Furthermore, Congressional preemptive
intent was found by the Court in its answer to the
government's argument that §605 did not forbid
state wiretapping where authorized by appropriate
state legislation.
"Respondent does not urge that, constitutionally
speaking, Congress is without power to forbid
such wiretapping even in the face of a conflicting
state law. Rather the argument is that Congress
has not exercised this power and that Section
605, being general in its terms, should not be
deemed to operate to prevent a State from
authorizing wiretapping in the exercise of its
legitimate police functions. However, we read
the Federal Communications Act, and Section
605 in particular, to the contrary.
The Federal Communications Act is a com-
prehensive scheme for the regulation of inter-
state communication .... Section 605... applies
both to intrastate and to interstate communi-
cations.... Respondent points to portions of the
Act which place some limited authority in the
States over the field of interstate communica-
tion.... The very existence of these grants of
authority to the States underscores the con-
clusion that had Congress intended to allow the
States to make exceptions to Section 605, it would
have said so. In light of the above considerations,
and keeping in mind this comphrehensive scheme
of interstate regulation and the public policy
underlying Section 605 as part of that scheme,
we find that Congress, setting out a prohibition
in plain terms, did not mean to allow state legisla-
tion which would contradict that section and that
policy." 5 (Emphasis added.)
Here, in plain language, the Court found state
legislation authorizing wiretapping preempted by
§605 of the Federal Communications Act.
Prior to Benanti, wiretapping was permitted
under New York law in certain situations.' In
order to wiretap "legally", it was necessary to
obtain a court order which was to issue in some-
what the same fashion as a search warrant. Follow-
ing the Benanti decision, judge Samuel Hofstadter
of the New York Supreme Court, in a memoran-
dum opinion, advised New York law enforcement
officers that he, for one, would no longer issue
wiretap orders. "Under the decision in Benanti,
orders authorizing interceptions are contrary to
controlling Federal law. Its authority requires me,
6355 U.S. 96, 105 (1957).
6 N.Y. CONST. art. I §12; N.Y. Pen. §§813 (a), 813 (b)
therefore, to deny any application for such an
order. For all wiretaps, whether 'authorized' or
not in this State are now illegal."
7
judge Hofstader notwithstanding, state courts,
including those of New York, are not unanimous
in their acceptance of preemption by §605.8 Nor
is total preemption the necessary effect of the
Benanti decision. In People v. Broady9 the New
York Court of Appeals held that a New York
statute punishing wiretapping did not impinge on
federal jurisdiction. The court stated that, ac-
cording to the standards of federal preemption
set out by the United States Supreme Court in
Pennsylvania v. Nelson,"° the Benanti court did
Matter of Interception of Telephone Communica-
tions, 9 Misc.2d 121, 170 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1958). Cf. People
v. Dinan, 172 N.Y.S.2d 496 (1958), rev'd. 181 N.Y.S.2d
122 (1958), aff'd. 185 N.Y.S.2d 806 (1959), cert. den.
361 U.S. 839 (1959). In Dinan, the New York court
acknowledged a real possibility of preemption by §605,
but concluded that this could not affect the admission
of wiretaps into evidence. It should be noted that New
York does not exclude evidence illegally obtained.
People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
8 See for example, Robert v. State, 220 Md. 159,
151 A.2d 737, 741 (1959). The court reversed de-
fendant's conviction because the principal evidence
against defendant, a wiretap, was not obtained in con-
formity with a Maryland statute purporting to author-
ize wiretapping on the ex parle order of a state's at-
torney or judge. MD. CODE Art. 35 §§92-99. The court
acknowledged that the state statute would fall if in
conflict with the federal regulations but stated: "Here
we find no conflict; the State Act simply excludes evi-
dence obtained in violation of the state statute, which
would otherwise be admissible notwithstanding the
Federal Act." While this is not a decision on the validity
of the permissive portions of the act, the implication is
that evidence obtained pursuant to the state statute
would be admissible even if the act is itself contrary to
controlling federal law. And see: In re Application for
Order Permitting Interception of Telephone Com-
munications, 198 N.Y.S.2d 572, 574 (1960). Speaking
of the New York practice of authorizing wiretapping by
court order pursuant to the state's permissive statute
(supra note 6) the court stated: "Notwithstanding the
Benanti case, however, the practice generally of
authorizing wiretaps continued in New York." Judge
Davidson went on to find "authorized" wiretapping in
conflict with §605, thus following the lead provided by
Judge Hofstadter in Matter of Interception of Tele-
phone Communications, supra note 7.
9 5 N.Y.2d 500, 186 N.Y.S.2d 230 (1959).
10 350 U.S. 497 (1956). The Supreme Court set out
three criteria of preemptive intent: "[First, when]
taken as a whole,... [the] congressional plan... makes
it reasonable to determine that no room has been left
for the States to supplement it. Therefore, a state...
statute is superseded regardless of whether it purports
to supplement the federal law... Second, [when] the
federal statutes touch a field in which the federal in-
terest is so dominant that the federal system [must] be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the
same subject.... Third, [when] enforcement of
state... acts presents a serious danger of conflict with
the administration of the federal program."
1961]
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not mean to imply that "§605 was so pervasive
as to preclude a State penal statute punishing
wiretapping.""
The New York court is not alone in refusing to
recognize total preemption of state law by §605.
The then Attorney General of Pennsylvania,
Thomas McBride, while testifying before the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the
Committee on the Judiciary before the United
States Senate in May of 1958, stated that in his
opinion, Pennsylvania (under legislation existing
in that state) could prosecute federal officers
violating Pennsylvania law-provided that said
officers were also violating federal law. 2
Congressional silence as to wiretap/eavesdrop
practices not proscribed by §605 does suggest
that these are areas open for state regulation,
and several states have filled the void with legisla-
tion considerably stricter that §605.13 Where the
federal statute covers only limited situations
arising in wiretapping, these states cover all wire-
tap activity. Where the federal enactment is silent
on electronic eavesdropping, this conduct is made
illegal."4
11 People v. Broady, suepra note 9 at 240. Further
credence may be lent to the New York court's opinion
by the decision in Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72
(1959), which limited Pennsylvania v. Nelson, supra
note 10, to cases of direct overlapping of state and fed-
eral statutes so as to prevent "a race between federal
and state prosecutors to the courthouse door." Uphaus
v. Wyman, supra this note at 76. The states were thus
left free to protect themselves with appropriate legisla-
tion. Ibid. But query whether a distinction should not
be drawn between sedition, which might in a particu-
lar instance be directed solely against a local govern-
mental unit (and therefore not a proper subject for
federal regulation) and wiretapping, which always in-
volves interference with a channel of interstate com-
merce (and, perhaps, is therefore never a proper sub-
ject for state regulation, even when in aid of that of the
federal government).
12 Hearing on Wiretapping, Eavesdropping, and the
Bill of Rights Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Com-
inittee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, pp.
20-25 (May 20, 1958).
13 See for example: ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 38 §206
(1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §§2443, 4688. The cited
statutes make the mere listening to, or intercepting of,
messages unlawful. The federal act has been interpreted
(by the justice Department) to require both intercep-
tion and divulgence for a violation. Whether both ele-
ments are really necessary before a violation of §605
occurs may be doubted. See Massicot v. United States,
254 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1958). The Treasury Department
has interpreted §605 as proscribing interception without
more. The essentiality of both elements to a violation
of §605 has never been decided by the Supreme Court.
Benanti v. United States, supra note 5, n. 5 at p. 100 of
the opinion.
11 Electronic eavesdropping may be distinguished
from wiretapping in that the former involves amplifca-
Coverage in excess of §605 does not necessarily
save such state enactments from preemption. In
the face of federal preemptive intent, state legis-
lation in aid of, as well as in derogation of, that
of the federal government must fall.5 However,
restrictive state statutes may be saved from un-
constitutionality by severability clauses which
must be given effect by courts interpreting them 6
It is therefore possible that at least part of the
state legislation, e.g., that pertaining to electronic
eavesdropping, could stand. 7
tion of sound waves emitted from a sound producing
source, thus enabling the listener to hear what would
otherwise be beyond earshot, whereas the latter in-
volves the interception of electrical impulses (usually
from wires, but conceivably from micro-wave relays)
and the translation of those impulses into audible sound
waves. Thus, "bugging" a room with microphones
would be electronic eavesdropping, while attaching a
listening device to a telephone wire would constitute
wiretapping. An induction coil system of interception
would constitute wriretapping. Although the distinc-
tion may seem both technical and artificial, it is im-
portant, for it is only interception and divulgence of the
electrical impulses which is made a criminal offense by
§605. Compare On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747
(1952) with Nardone v. United States, supra note 2.
"5Charleston & Western Car. RR. v. Varnville &
Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915).
16 Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941). The rationale
for total preemption is the necessity of avoiding any
chance of burdening interstate commerce. While this
burden is clear in the case of permissive state wiretap
legislation, the burden cast upon interstate activity
by restrictive state legislation is of questionable exist-
ence. Implementation of severability clauses would
serve to remove burdensome portions of a state's legisla-
tion while preserving the privacy protection secured by
the restrictive sections. Cf. Atlantic C.L. RR. Co. v.
Georgia, 234 U.S. 280 (1914).
17 It must be noted, however, that the states are
powerless to inhibit the activities of federal officers
validly exercising an investment of federal authority.
Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276 (1899); Boske v.
Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900); U.S. CoNsT. art. VI
cl. 2. (supremacy clause.) The immunity from state
regulation is not total, but is limited to action reason-
ably necessary and proper to the attainment of the
assigned mission. Compare In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1,
75 (1890), with Oklahoma v. Willingham, 143 F. Supp.
445 (Okla. 1956). In the former case a murder prosecu-
tion was set aside on the ground that the defendant's
act was reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of
the federal policy (protection of a federal judge while
on the circuit). In the latter case, a federal court re-
manded to the state a traffic violation prosecution
which had been removed to the federal court by the
defendant mail truck driver. Violation of local traffic
regulations was not considered reasonably necessary to
the efficient delivery of mail. When the particular ac-
tion proscribed by the state is specifically demanded of
the federal officer, the state can do nothing. But the in-
vestment of federal authority may be implied. Tennes-
see v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (10 Otto. 1879); In re Neagle,
supra this note. When this is the case, the question is
how far to go in finding, in congressional silence, an im-
[Vol. 51
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While it may be conceded that restrictive state
wiretap legislation is consistent with federal policy
and should not be overturned, the same cannot be
said of permissive state wiretap legislation. The
Benanti holding of federal preemption in this
area was clear and unequivocal. Still, the overall
impact of the Benanti decision on state wiretap
activity remains uncertain; this is in no small
measure due to the Court's decision to preserve
the earlier case of Schwartz v. Texas'
s
In the Schwartz case the Supreme Court held
state procured wiretap evidence admissible in a
state prosecution. Analogizing to the fourth
amendment cases,19 the Court suggested that:
"The problem under §605 is somewhat different
because the introduction of the intercepted com-
munication would itself be a violation of the statute,
but in the absence of an expression by Congress,
this is simply an additional factor for a state
to consider in formulating a rule of evidence
for use in its own courts."' 0 (Emphasis added.)
The Court went on to say that §605 could be
enforced by the penal provisions of §501" without
exclusion of the evidence; that apparently Texas
had carefully legislated to provide for the admis-
sibility of wiretap evidence; that if Congress had
intended to preempt the field it should have said
plication of authority to indulge in activity specifically
outlawed by an exercise of the state's police power, an
exercise valid but for its affect on federal agents. The
problem is avoidable by excision of the provision
making the statute applicable to federal officers. But a
federal court may be incompetent to place this construc-
tion upon a state statute, and, without a prior interpre-
tation from a court of the state, may be bound by the
legislation as enacted. Beal v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Corp.
312 U.S. 45 (1941). For further discussion of the validity
and problems of state regulation of federal wiretap/
eavesdrop practices not proscribed by §605, see Note,
67 YALE L. J. 932 (1957).
Is 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
" In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)
the Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule for
federal courts as a means of enforcing the provisions of
the fourth amendment relating to unreasonable searches
and seizures. In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)
the Court held the states bound by the "core" pro-
visions of the fourth amendment under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, but otherwise free
to enforce those provisions by means other than ex-
clusion of the unconstitutionally seized evidence. By
analogy to these decisions, the Court in Schwartz rea-
soned that the federal decision to exclude from its
courts wiretap evidence should not be binding on state
courts, since §605 could be enforced through §501.
2 Supra note 18.
2 48 Stat. 1064, 1098 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §§151, 501
(1959). The penalty for violation of §605 is set by §501
at a fine not to exceed $10,000. and/or imprisonment
for a term not to exceed one year.
so in clear and unequivocal terms; and finally,
that Congress had not so expressed its intent and
therefore it would not be implied.
The conclusion that the fourth amendment
analogy is inapplicable to the wiretap situation
seems inescapable. Federal courts have adopted
the exclusionary rule to implement the fourth
amendment provisions relating to unreasonable
searches and seizures." The states, while bound
by the core provisions of the fourth amendment
under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, are free to enforce the basic right
against arbitrary police invasion by whatever
means seem reasonable."
States not following the exclusionary rule gen-
erally choose that course for two reasons. The
evidence is no less reliable for the illegality con-
nected with its seizure, and, in any case, the con-
stitutional violation is complete long before the
evidence secured thereby is to be admitted. Ex-
clusion of the evidence thus serves neither to
punish the offender, nor to prevent his offense."
This is not the situation in wiretap cases. As
was recognized by the Court in both the Benanti
and Schwartz decisions, the mere giving of testi-
mony to the existence or contents of a wiretap is
in itself the commission of the very act made
criminal by §605. If wiretap evidence is to be
admitted, a court must, in effect, consent to the
commission of a federal crime. This is the error.
It cannot be overcome by the existence of penal
sanctions under §501.26 Allowing the wiretap to
come in, the court, in a stroke, sanctions a crime
and inflicts irreparable injury on the defendant.
By way of compensation he is allowed a civil suit
for damages and, perhaps, a chance to prosecute
the prosecutor.28
One explanation of Schwartz is that, by pointing
out the criminality of admitting wiretap evidence,
the Court hoped to guide state tribunals to the
exclusion of such evidence. Thus, there would be
no imposition on state sovereignity and the delicate
balance of federalism would be preserved. That
the road suggested by the Schwartz decision has
not been unerringly followed by state courts is
2Weeks v. United States, supra note 19.
"Wolf v. Colorado, supra note 19.
24 8 WiGuoE, EvmzNcEz §2184 (3d ed. 1940); People
v. Defore, supra note 7; cf. opinion of Traynor, J. in
People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
21 See supra note 21.
16 In re Application for Order Permitting Intercep-
tion of Telephone Communications, supra note 8.
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clear. In fact, time after time wiretap evidence
has been admitted in state prosecutions?
Nor may a state court suggest that federal law
is law of a foreign sovereign; and therefore, the
federal government and not the state is charged
with its enforcement. "The Constitution and the
laws passed pursuant to it are the supreme laws
of the land, binding alike upon states, courts, and
the people, anything in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."1n
Another rationalization of Schwartz is that the
federal government is incompetent to make a rule
of evidence for the states. Although it is arguable
that Congress or the Supreme Court does have
this power, 9 the easy answer is that it has not
done so. Instead, Congress has seen fit to make a
particular act a crime, regardless of where, or
under what circumstances, committed. In this
posture, any court permitting testimony to a
wiretap is refusing to comply with the clear man-
date of the supremacy clause and at the same time
being, for practical purposes, an accessory before
the fact.
The decision to preserve Schwartz forced the
Benanti Court to a strained interpretation of
27 For example see: People v. Maranian, 359 Mich.
361, 102 N.W.2d 568 (1960); State v. Giardina, 27
N.J. 313, 142 A.2d 609 (1958); People v. Variano,
5 N.Y.2d 391, 185 NY.S.2d 1 (1958); People v.
Saperstein, 2 N.Y.2d 210, 159 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1958);
Commonwealth v. Voci, 393 Pa. 404, 143 A.2d 652
(1958); State v. Tracey, 100 N.H. 267, 125 A.2d 774
(1956); Commonwealth v. Chaitt, 380 Pa. 532, 112
A.2d 379 (1955); White v. State, 204 Md. 442, 104
A.2d 810 (1954).2
8 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 391 (1947); Robb v.
Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884).
29 See for example, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952), where the Court overturned the state's decision
to admit tangible evidence secured by a forced "stom-
ach pumping." Although the evidence (which consisted
of heroin capsules swallowed by defendant upon his
arrest) was surely no less reliable for the obnoxious
method by which it was obtained, the Court held that
this was "conduct that shocks the conscience," viola-
tive of due process, and that the evidence was
improperly admitted. From this it may be concluded
that any unnsually offensive conduct would "shock the
conscience" and therefore lead to inadmissibility of the
evidence obtained thereby, regardless of the reliability
factor. And see: Wolf v. Colorado, supra note 19 at 33,
and Schwartz v. Texas, supra note 18 at 202. In both
instances the Court expressly reserved comment on the
power of Congress to impose a rule evidence on the
states. And as to the limitations on the Rochin doctrine,
see: Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954). (Rochin
apparently limited to invasions of the body of the de-
fendant.) See also: People v. Grant, 179 N.Y.S.2d 384
(1958); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951);
Rutledge, J. dissenting in Wolf v. Colorado, supra note
19 at 48.
§605. That "no person.., shall intercept" was
too clear a statement to permit a construction
excluding state authorized wiretapping from its
mandate. Thus the Supreme Court found the
ban on interception specifically applicable to state
law enforcement agents, notwithstanding the
existence of directly conflicting state legislation."
Yet to have found an equally broad mandate in
the phrase "no person ... shall... divulge" would
have compelled the Court to forbid testimony in
violation of §605 and so overturn the Schwartz
decision.
Unwilling to impose so far on state-federal
relations, and perhaps apprehensive of coming to
a decision which might be interpreted as federal
nullification of a state rule of evidence and thus
inviting congressional action attempting further
invalidation of state practices inconsistent with
those of the federal courts, the Supreme Court
chose to limit the divulgence provision of §605 to
prohibiting wiretap testimony in federal courts."
Thus the Court found in the divulgence provisions
of §605 a standard far more stringent in its appli-
cation to federal tribunals than that applicable
to state courts acting under the same statute.
At the same time the interception provisions of
§605 were given a scope so broad as to preempt
the clear expression of state policy embodied in
state legislation providing for "authorized" wire-
tapping.
While "mere logical symmetry and abstract
reasoning are perhaps not enough"' to justify
what would admittedly be an intrusion by federal
authority into state affairs, the failure to import
equal emphasis to both the divulgence and in-
terception provisions of §605 results in more than
a lapse of neat logic. With the admissibility of
wiretap evidence inhibited at the state level only
by the threat of federal prosecution for the result-
ing violation of §605,3 and that eventuality being
remote in the extreme,u it is plain that there is
30 Benanti v. United States, supra note 5 and accom-
panying text.
31 Id. at 101, heading I of the opinion.
12The phrase is from Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 1443 (1960), where the Su-
preme Court held evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment by state officers acting without fed-
eral assistance inadmissible in a federal prosecution,
thus overturning the "silver platter" doctrine.
3 Schwartz v. Texas, supra note 18 at 202. The Court
stated that the fact that the admission of wiretap evi-
dence would violate §605 was but another factor for
states to consider in formulating evidentiary rules for
use in their courts.
- DASH, SCHWARTZ, & KNOWLTON, Tm EAvES-
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little, if any, motivation for a cessation of state
wiretap practices. Thus the states are allowed to
attribute to §605 an interpretation which might
well be described as imputing to that statute a
"self-defeating, if not disingenuous purpose." 35
The confusion pervading the wiretap area leaves
the defendant seeking to exclude wiretap evidence
from use in a state court, the state court witness
seeking to avoid the commission of a federal
crime, and the state legislature seeking a firm
answer as to the legality of its enactments, grasp-
ing at straws in support of their embattled posi-
tions.
If the defendant is to make full use of the aids
available to him, he must act before the trial is
under way. When the wiretap to be introduced
against him was obtained by federal agents, and
the state is relying upon that testimony, the de-
fendant may be able to obtain a federal order
enjoining the federal agent from testifying at the
state's prosecution. While this tack apparently
has never been attempted in a wiretap case on
the ground of the imminent violation of §605,
it has been successfully employed to prevent a
federal agent from testifying in a state prosecution
to evidence obtained in violation of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure relating to illegal
searches and seizures.36 The basis for the injunc-
tion was to force federal agents to abide by the
standards propounded by the Federal Rules. It
would seem that if an injunction would issue to
prevent a violation of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure, then one would issue to prevent a
violation of the Federal Communications Act.
If the state's case does not depend upon the
availability of a federal agent as a witness, the
defendant may still be able to procure an injunc-
tion from a federal court to prevent the state from
DROPPERS (1959). The authors suggest that prosecu-
tions for violation of §605 are on the increase. Id. at
402. Nevertheless, their numbers seem infinitesimal in
comparison to the number of taps allegedly in opera-
tion. Id. at 38-44. But cf. Brown, The Great Wiretapping
Debate and the Crisis ini Law Enforcement, 6 N.Y.L.F.
265, 270-272 (1960).
35 The phrase is from Nardone v. United States,
supra note 3, and was quoted by the Court in Benanti,
supra note 5, in describing the effect of not excluding
wiretap evidence in federal prosecutions. Presumably
the effect would be the same if wiretap evidence were
not excluded from state prosecutions.36 Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956). (Fed-
eral agent enjoined from testifying in New Mexico
narcotics prosecution after failure of federal prosecu-
tion on ground that the federal officer improperly ob-
tained warrant.)
using wiretap evidence against him, if the use of
such evidence would result in the violation of
§605. The most recent instances of such an attack
are to be found in the New York cases of -Pitgach
v. Dollinger and O'Rourke v. LenineY In Pugach a
stay of the use of wiretap evidence was grantedn8
pending defendant's appeal from an order refusing
to grant a preliminary injunction.39 In O'Rourke,
a similar stay was denied,40 .Pugach being distin-
guished in that there the trial had not yet begun,
while in O'Rourke, it was in progress.
Subsequently, both cases were heard by the full
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The
decision was that "a Federal Court should not
intervene in criminal prosecutions by a state for
violation of its criminal laws." Judge Waterman
concurring, said: "I am not willing to assume that
a New York State trial judge will permit such
evidence to be admitted over the objection of
defense counsel. After all, New York State judges,
as we, were bound when they took office, to sup-
port the Constitution.... It is therefore presump-
tuous to assume that a New York State trial
judge will acquiesce to the commission of a crime
against the United States in his presence in his
courtroom by a witness testifying under oath."41
37 Earlier attempts of defendants to federally enjoin
an imminent violation of §605 in the course of a state
prosecution have proved inconclusive, none having
been carried past the district court level. See: Voci v.
Farkas, 144 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Pa. 1956) and Burack v.
State Liquor Authority, 160 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. N.Y.
1958).
38 Pugach v. Dollinger, 275 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1960).
31Pugach v. Sullivan, 180 F. Supp. 66 (S.D. N.Y.
1960).
40 O'Rourke v. Levine, 363 U.S. 836 (1960).
43 Pugach v. Dollinger, 277 F.2d 739, 742, 745 (2d
Cir. 1960). It was recognized by the majority, concur-
ring, and dissenting opinions that the particular wire-
taps in issue comprised but isolated instances of a gen-
eral practice in New York of "authorizing" wiretaps.
The conclusions as to what should be done about this
ranged from the majority outlook that it is the state's
concern; through the concurring opinion's refusal to
concede that the evidence would be admitted without
prosecution by United States district attorneys; to the
dissenter's view that only by federal injunctive action
would this flagrant flaunting of federal law be ended.
The majority also seemed to take some refuge in the
doctrine that equity will not enjoin the commission of
a crime. This doctrine appears to be based first on the
fear of denying the prospective defendant a trial by
jury and second, hesitancy to substitute the contempt
penalty for that provided by the legislature. State v.
Red Owl Stores, 244 N.W.2d 103 (Minn. 1958). In the
wiretap situation the first ground seems inapplicable
since ordinarily there is no question as to the fact of the
statutory violation. The merit of the second ground is
doubtful when weighed against the peril to the
person against whom the crime is to be committed.
